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Abstract
Background: Introduced in 2004, the United Kingdom’s (UK) Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) is the world’s
largest primary-care pay-for-performance programme. Given some evidence of the benefits and the substantial costs
associated with the QOF, it remains unclear whether the programme is cost-effective. Therefore, we assessed the cost-
effectiveness of continuing versus stopping the QOF.
Methods: We developed a lifetime simulation model to estimate quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) and costs for a UK
population cohort aged 40–74 years (n = 27,070,862) exposed to the QOF and for a counterfactual scenario without
exposure. Based on a previous retrospective cross-country analysis using data from 1994 to 2010, we assumed the
benefits of the QOF to be a change in age-adjusted mortality of −3.68 per 100,000 population (95% confidence interval
–8.16 to 0.80). We used cost-effectiveness thresholds of £30,000/QALY, £20,000/QALY and £13,000/QALY to determine
the optimal strategy in base-case and sensitivity analyses.
Results: In the base-case analysis, continuing the QOF increased population-level QALYs and health-care costs yielding
an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) of £49,362/QALY. The ICER remained >£30,000/QALY in scenarios with
and without non-fatal outcomes or increased drug costs, and under differing assumptions about the duration of QOF
benefit following its hypothetical discontinuation. The ICER for continuing the programme fell below £30,000/QALY
when QOF incentive payments were 36% lower (while preserving QOF mortality benefits), and in scenarios where the
QOF resulted in substantial reductions in health-care spending or non-fatal cardiovascular disease events. Continuing
the QOF was cost-effective in 18%, 3% and 0% of probabilistic sensitivity analysis iterations using thresholds of £30,000/
QALY, £20,000/QALY and £13,000/QALY, respectively.
Conclusions: Compared to stopping the QOF and returning all associated incentive payments to the National Health
Service, continuing the QOF is not cost-effective. To improve population health efficiently, the UK should redesign the
QOF or pursue alternative interventions.
Background
Introduced in 2004, the United Kingdom’s Quality and
Outcomes Framework (QOF) is the world’s largest pri-
mary-care pay-for-performance programme. The QOF
links up to 25% of general practitioners’ income to per-
formance on a wide range of quality indicators related
to clinical management of common chronic conditions,
organisation of care and patient experience [1]. This
supplements existing payments to practices, which are
largely provided through capitation payments. Research
on the QOF suggests that the programme accelerated
improvement for the incentivised indicators in the 3
years following its implementation [2]. However, this
improvement appeared to attenuate over time [3–5]. A
recent analysis also found that the QOF did not signifi-
cantly improve mortality for disease areas targeted
under the programme [6].
The QOF is subject to annual review, with changes
agreed in negotiations between National Health Service
(NHS) Employers and the British Medical Association’s
General Practitioners Committee, informed by indicator
development work conducted by the National Institute for
Health and Care Excellence. In 2014/15, 40 indicators—
accounting for 35% of the value of total incentive
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payments—were removed from the scheme without re-
placement, with most of the associated resource used to
increase capitation payments [7]. In 2016/17, QOF was
discontinued altogether in Scotland and funding was
transferred to capitation payments [8]. QOF continues
in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, although op-
tions for reform or replacement are being considered.
Despite the large costs of the QOF and other pay-for-
performance programmes, almost no evidence exists on
their cost-effectiveness and how this compares to other
system-level interventions to improve longevity [5, 9, 10].
Pay-for-performance programmes introduce additional
economic costs to the health-care system, which could
have been spent on other health interventions or policies.
A cost-effectiveness analysis, the standard method for
assessing value for money, can be used to determine
whether additional spending on pay-for-performance is
worth the health gains produced by these policies.
Although a cost-effectiveness analysis has previously
been conducted for other pay-for-performance pro-
grammes in the UK, decisions on the development or
discontinuation of QOF have not been informed by
reliable estimates of cost-effectiveness [11]. A systematic
review of pay-for-performance programmes found that,
despite the promise of cost-effective financial incentives,
convincing evidence of the cost-effectiveness of pay-for-
performance was lacking [12]. Previous attempts to esti-
mate the cost-effectiveness of pay-for-performance have
extrapolated evidence from randomised trials, rather
than using direct evidence of its effectiveness on out-
comes [4, 9, 13]. These approaches are limited because
results from randomised trials may not generalise to
the older, sicker patients who are typically excluded
from trials [6].
In this study, we address this knowledge gap by
evaluating the cost-effectiveness of the QOF under
various assumptions around the programme’s benefits
and costs.
Methods
Overview
We developed a computer-based simulation model to
estimate the QOF-related lifetime health effects and
costs for a representative UK general population cohort
aged 40–74 years (n = 27,070,862) exposed to two com-
peting policy alternatives: (1) continuing the QOF and
(2) stopping the QOF. We compared the trade-off
between lifetime discounted health effects, quantified
using quality-adjusted life years (QALYs), and QOF-re-
lated health-care costs using an incremental cost-effect-
iveness analysis from a NHS (health-care payer)
perspective. The simulation model discounts health effects
and costs using a rate of 3.5% [14]. An overview of our
methodology is shown in Fig. 1.
Simulation model and population
The overall goal for our model-based analysis was to
estimate the impact of continuing the QOF (compared
to stopping the QOF) on lifetime QALYs and costs. The
decision of whether or not to continue the QOF will
have the most impact on the specific diseases targeted
by the QOF. For instance, the lifetime QALYs gained
would be greater if the QOF mortality reductions were
concentrated in healthy children as opposed to older
persons with multiple chronic conditions. Of all the
conditions actually included in the QOF, cardiovascular
diseases and associated risk conditions (coronary heart
disease, stroke, diabetes and hypertension) collectively at-
tract the largest incentives and account for the majority of
non-cancer deaths (although cancer is included in the
QOF, it only receives weak incentives) [6, 15–17]. In
2005, payments of up to £15,125 were available for the
average family practice across 15 ischaemic heart dis-
ease and heart failure indicators, but only £1500 was
available across two cancer indicators [6]. Therefore,
we assumed that the QOF benefits were concentrated
in individuals with cardiovascular disease (aged 40–
Fig. 1 Conceptual diagram of the cost-effectiveness analysis. Individuals enter the simulation model and are assigned to one of two QOF
scenarios. The model estimates the impact of continuing or stopping the QOF on mortality, morbidity and QOF-related cost outcomes. The
trade-offs between quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) and costs are evaluated by calculating an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) for
continuing the QOF. ICER incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, QALY quality-adjusted life year, QOF Quality and Outcomes Framework
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74 years at baseline) in our base-case analysis, but re-
laxed this assumption in sensitivity analyses (including a
scenario where the QOF equally benefited all individuals
aged 0–74 years with and without disease). We needed to
make these assumptions around which population seg-
ments would benefit from the QOF because our main ef-
fectiveness estimate for the QOF did not specify in whom
the mortality benefits were concentrated, but rather re-
ported an overall age-adjusted mortality reduction of 3.68
per 100,000 (across those aged 0–74 years) [6].
We created a hypothetical cohort that would be affected
by the QOF using age group- and sex-specific population
sizes for the UK, further dividing this population into
those with and those without prevalent cardiovascular
disease. We used Office for National Statistics data for
sex-specific population sizes in 5-year age categories
(e.g., 2,255,562 females aged 50–54 years at baseline)
and sex- and age-specific cardiovascular disease preva-
lence estimates from British Heart Foundation data (e.g.
8.4% of females aged 50–54 years at baseline had prevalent
cardiovascular disease, ICD-10 codes I00–I99) [15, 16].
Our model uses annual cycles to project the life expect-
ancy, quality-adjusted life expectancy and QOF-related
costs for a representative UK cohort until death. Each
model population segment faces a risk of death in each
model cycle based on the sex, age and cardiovascular dis-
ease status of the group being simulated, with additional
mortality risk adjustments to account for the absence of
the QOF for the non-QOF strategy (i.e. the current life ta-
bles include the effects of the QOF, so we increased the
risk of death in the life tables when simulating the
non-QOF strategy). Those with cardiovascular disease
faced higher mortality risks and reduced quality of life
compared to those without cardiovascular disease. To
estimate mortality risks for those with cardiovascular
disease, we multiplied the annual mortality risk all-cause
life tables (i.e. the age-specific annual risks of death from
any cause) by 1.6 (for men) or 2.1 (for women). These
age-adjusted mortality ratios were based on an analysis of
linked hospital discharge and 7-year mortality follow-up
data from survivors of first acute myocardial infarction in
England from 2004 to 2010 [18]. We subtracted cardiovas-
cular disease mortality rates from all-cause life tables to
estimate mortality risks for those without cardiovascular
disease [18]. The model sums all health effects and costs
accrued for each population segment, yielding population-
level results. Table 1 shows all model inputs and data
sources. The model is programmed in Microsoft Excel
with Visual Basic for Applications and is included as
Additional file 1.
QOF mortality effects
The mortality increase from stopping the QOF was esti-
mated from a previous difference-in-difference analysis
[6]. In their study, Ryan et al. created a synthetic control
group as a weighted combination of countries previously
characterised as having a high-income epidemiological
profile. Based on their study, the QOF programme was
associated with a change in age- and sex-adjusted mortality
from the major contributors to population mortality
targeted by the QOF (ischaemic heart disease, hyper-
tension, stroke, diabetes, chronic kidney disease, asthma
and chronic pulmonary disease) of −3.68 per 100,000
population (95% confidence interval of −8.16 to 0.80).
Table 1 Model variables with base-case values and ranges used in sensitivity analyses
Variable Base-case value Sensitivity analysis range Source(s)
QOF mortality benefit (age- and sex-adjusted per 100,000) −3.68 −8.16 to 0.80 [6]
Adjusted QOF mortality benefit (for those with age > 40 years with CVD) −58.93 −130.57 to 12.81 Calculated
All-cause age- and sex-specific mortality (and age and sex demographics) Life table Not applicable [45]
CVD prevalence, males (aged 45–64 years, aged 65–74 years) 14.6%, 28.5% +/− 20% [16]
CVD prevalence, females (aged 45–64 years, aged 65–74 years) 8.4%, 22.5% +/− 20% [16]
CVD mortality multiplier (male, female) 1.6, 2.1 +/−20% [18]
CVD utility 0.796 +/− 20% [21]
Non-fatal-to-fatal CVD events averted (ratio) 1.63 0–10 [20]
QOF annual population-level incentive costs £1,396,843,151 £0–2,000,000,000 Country-specific
sources [24, 26, 27]
QOF effect on utilisation costs per £ spent on incentives £0.011 -£1-£1 [29, 30]
Acute CVD event costs (i.e. costs within first year of CVD event) £10,871 +/−20% [31]
Chronic CVD event costs (i.e. annual costs for all years after first year) £3282 +/− 20% [31]
Average NHS costs by age Age-based table £0 to + 100% [32]
Discount rate 3.5% 0–5% [14]
QOF Quality and Outcomes Framework, CVD cardiovascular disease, NHS National Health Service
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This estimate was based on age-adjusted mortality rates
for populations aged 0–74 years. Since QOF mortality
benefits would be concentrated in older individuals with
prevalent disease, we adjusted the mortality effect used in
our model by back-calculating mortality change (58.9 per
100,000 population) in older individuals (aged 40–74 years,
n = 27,070,862) with prevalent cardiovascular disease that
would result in the Ryan et al. general population result.
In other words, a 58.9 per 100,000 mortality decrease
concentrated exclusively in individuals aged 40–74 years
with cardiovascular disease would result in a 3.68 per
100,000 mortality effect in all individuals (aged 0–74 years
among individuals with and without cardiovascular disease,
n = 59,385,341). We performed a sensitivity analysis using
a 3.68 per 100,000 mortality decrease for all individuals
(aged 0–74 years) to assess the impact of these two
contrasting assumptions (mortality effect concentrated
in those aged 40–74 years versus mortality effect spread
out among those aged 0–74 years) on the model results.
While either assumption had QOF mortality effects
stopping at age 74 years (due to our data source [6]), the
model cohort was modelled until death in all analyses.
In the base-case analyses, we assumed the QOF-related
mortality benefit was immediately lost if the QOF were
discontinued. In the sensitivity analyses, we modelled
different durations over which the mortality benefit of
the QOF waned if the programme were discontinued.
In these scenarios, we assumed linear declines in the
QOF mortality benefit from first year in the model to a
time in the future (1, 3, 5 or 10 years from the model
start), at which point the mortality benefit from the
QOF would equal zero.
QOF non-fatal effects (i.e. QOF morbidity effects)
Best practice in a cost-effectiveness analysis is to include
all health outcomes (fatal and non-fatal) that differ from
the choice of a particular strategy over another [19].
While it is likely that the QOF resulted in changes in
both fatal and non-fatal outcomes, the Ryan et al. study
did not include non-fatal outcomes due to data restric-
tions. Given the QOF focus on managing cardiovascular
disease risk, we applied a ratio of non-fatal cardiovascular
disease events averted for every fatal event averted from
the QOF based on prevented cardiovascular disease events
from a meta-analysis of statin trial data from 90,056 partic-
ipants [20]. First, we calculated the differences in non-fatal
coronary heart disease events between statin and placebo
arms in the meta-analysis (1789 – 2460) and divided that
difference by the difference in coronary heart disease
deaths (1548 – 1960), which resulted in a ratio of non-
fatal-to-fatal coronary heart disease events averted of 1.63.
We multiplied this ratio by the difference in mortality
between the QOF and non-QOF counterfactuals in the
model to estimate the number of non-fatal cardiovascular
disease events averted by the QOF in each model cycle.
The model incorporates morbidity in the QALYcalculation
by applying utility values (see Health-related quality-of-life
section below) to the non-fatal cardiovascular disease
events averted by the QOF. We performed sensitivity
analyses excluding non-fatal health effects attributable
to the QOF in the model in addition to varying the
value of the non-fatal-to-fatal ratio used in the model.
Health-related quality of life
The main effectiveness measure for our analysis was life-
time cohort-level QALYs. The model calculates QALYs
by multiplying the number of individuals alive in a given
year by a utility value, which quantifies morbidity. The
model assigns utility values ranging between 0 (death)
and 1 (perfect health) for each year based on age and
cardiovascular disease status. Older individuals and those
with cardiovascular disease have lower utility values than
younger individuals and those without cardiovascular
disease, respectively. Utility values were estimated from
the results of the EuroQOL 5 Dimensions (EQ-5D) ques-
tionnaire from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
(US-based descriptive responses to the EQ-5D were
combined with UK community-based preference weights to
calculate utility values for the UK) [21–23]. For a given age
(40–100 years), population segments with cardiovascular
disease were assigned the minimum utility for cardiovascu-
lar disease (0.796) and age-based utilities (ranging from
0.691–0.848). Population segments without cardiovascular
disease were assigned the age-based utility values [23].
QOF costs
We included two major QOF-related cost categories: (1)
incentive costs and (2) costs related to changes in
health-care utilisation as a result of QOF incentives. We
estimated total incentive costs over the first 7 years of the
programme at £1,396,843,151 per year based on remuner-
ation data from the four constituent countries of the UK
(see Table 4 in the Appendix) [24–27]. These costs include
payments for all domains (clinical, organisational and
patient experience) and are considered incremental (i.e.
new) costs to the health system, as opposed to reallocating
existing funds within the health system, as they represent
additional resources the UK government committed to
primary care in 2004 [28].
Given the focus of the QOF incentives on disease
management in the cardiovascular domain, we assumed
changes in health-care utilisation driven by the QOF
would be concentrated in the utilisation of cardiovascular
disease drugs (targeting cholesterol, blood pressure and
diabetes). We estimated changes in drug utilisation based
on an observational study in Scotland, which reported
an average increase in defined daily doses (DDDs) per
prescribing unit (PU) per month of QOF-related drugs
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of 3.79. Among these drugs, cardiovascular disease drugs
accounted for 3.47 of the average increase (DDD per PU,
89% of the total increase across all drugs mentioned or im-
plied by the QOF) [29]. For these costs, we used separated
DDD per PU per month estimates from that analysis for
five cardiovascular disease drug classes (lipid-regulating,
renin-angiotensin system, thiazides and related diuretics,
oral antidiabetics and antiplatelets) in conjunction with
weighted averages of drug class prices (Table 5 in the
Appendix) to estimate an overall annual increase in
QOF-related drug costs of £15,692,470 (i.e. a ratio of
0.011 of increased drug utilisation per £1 spent on
incentives) [30]. We allowed this value to be negative
(i.e. a cost saving) in a sensitivity analysis to evaluate
the possibility that QOF incentives might result in a net
decrease in overall health-care spending from averted
disease events and follow-up spending, by varying the
ratio from −1 to 1 in a one-way sensitivity analysis. In
the model, averted cardiovascular disease events (fatal
and non-fatal) resulted in cost savings from averted
health-care utilisation. We estimated the costs of averted
cardiovascular disease events in the first year of the event
(£10,871) and all subsequent years (£3282) from a previ-
ous analysis of linked UK cohort datasets with utilisation
and cost data [31]. We modelled future average age-based
annual health-care costs based on English NHS data and
performed separate sensitivity analyses where these costs
were excluded and doubled [32]. All costs in our analyses
are reported in 2016 pounds sterling (£).
Base-case cost-effectiveness analysis
We used conventional incremental cost-effectiveness
analysis methods to calculate an incremental cost-ef-
fectiveness ratio (ICER) for continuing the QOF
programme compared to stopping the QOF. We used
cost-effectiveness thresholds of £30,000/QALY, £20,000/
QALY and £13,000/QALY. These thresholds are based on
current National Institute for Health and Care Excellence
recommendations (£20,000–30,000/QALY) and a 2015
Claxton et al. study that estimated an empirically based
opportunity cost for health-care spending (i.e. a cost-ef-
fectiveness threshold that estimates the amount of money,
at the margin of health-care spending, it would take to
produce one additional QALY) in the UK (£13,000/QALY)
[33]. We also calculated the opportunity costs of continu-
ing the QOF in terms of population-level incremental net
health benefit, which converts incremental costs into
QALYs using a cost-effectiveness threshold and subtracts
these opportunity costs from QALYs gained as a result of
continuing the QOF. In other words, the incremental net
health benefit captures the health gains to individuals who
benefit from funding being given to an intervention minus
the population health forgone as a result of committed re-
sources being unavailable for other individuals’ health
care. The health forgone by other individuals was esti-
mated based on the cost-effectiveness thresholds noted
above [specifically, the QALYs forgone (incremental net
health benefit) equal the incremental costs divided by the
cost-effectiveness threshold] [34].
Sensitivity analyses
We performed four types of sensitivity analyses: (1) scenario
analyses for the inclusion of non-fatal health effects and
increased drug utilisation as a result of the QOF and
the duration of the QOF mortality benefit if the QOF
were discontinued, (2) one-way sensitivity analyses with
high and low values for all model inputs, (3) a two-way
sensitivity analysis for different combinations of the
levels of QOF incentive payments and the QOF mortality
benefit and (4) a probabilistic sensitivity analysis, where
we assessed the statistical uncertainty in the QOF
mortality benefit (which was based on an estimate that
had a 95% confidence interval of −0.80 to 8.16) by
drawing 1000 random values for the QOF mortality
benefit from a normal probability distribution [35]. The
probabilistic sensitivity analysis results for each of the
1000 iterations were used to construct a cost-effectiveness
acceptability curve showing the probability that continuing
the QOF was cost-effective while varying the cost-ef-
fectiveness threshold from £0–200,000/QALY.
Results
Base-case results
Continuing the QOF programme indefinitely would
result in more life years, QALYs and QOF-related costs
compared to stopping the QOF (Table 2). Compared to
stopping the QOF, continuing the QOF had an ICER of
£49,362/QALY under base-case assumptions (non-fatal
outcomes and increased drug costs included, with instant
changes in the QOF mortality benefit if the QOF is
discontinued, Table 2). The population opportunity cost of
continuing the QOF (i.e. the incremental net health bene-
fit) ranged from 226,109 to 979,917 QALYs lost, assuming
cost-effectiveness thresholds of £30,000/QALY to £13,000/
QALY, respectively (Table 6 in the Appendix).
Scenario analyses
Table 3 shows the matrix of ICERs for the QOF for
every combination of assumptions related to the inclu-
sion of non-fatal outcomes, the inclusion of increased
drug costs and waning of the QOF benefit. The ICER
remained greater than £30,000/QALY for every combin-
ation of assumptions. The ICER for continuing the QOF
was £42,296/QALY when we assumed all individuals
aged 40–74 years experienced the health benefits of the
QOF (as opposed to only those with prevalent cardiovas-
cular disease), and £31,089/QALY when the benefits of
the QOF were spread out to all individuals (with and
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without disease) aged 0–74 years (these findings can be
reproduced using the simulation model attached as
Additional file 1).
One-way sensitivity analyses
The ICER was only below alternative National Institute
for Health and Care Excellence thresholds of £30,000/
QALY, £20,000/QALY and £13,000/QALY when, for every
£1 spend on QOF incentives, £0.36, £0.55 or £0.68 were
saved as a result of net cost reductions (for example, from
averted cardiovascular disease events; Figure 4 in the
Appendix). Similarly, the ICER was below the thresholds
of £30,000/QALY, £20,000/QALY and £13,000/QALY
when the ratios for non-fatal-to-fatal cardiovascular dis-
ease events averted were 3.7 (225% of the base-case value),
5.5 (335% of the base-case value) and 7.3 (450% of the
base-case value, Figure 5 in the Appendix).
The cost-effectiveness results were robust (ICERs
within £40,000–65,000/QALY) in the following sensitiv-
ity analyses (with high and low parameter ranges as
reported in Table 1, unless otherwise specified): applying
the QOF mortality benefit to all individuals aged 0–74 years
as opposed to a concentrated (higher) mortality benefit to
those with prevalent cardiovascular disease, high and low
utility values, high and low cardiovascular disease preva-
lence and mortality multiplier estimates, and separate
scenarios removing and doubling the annual average future
health-care costs (Table 7 in the Appendix).
Two-way sensitivity analysis
Fig. 2 shows the ICER as a function of the levels of QOF
incentive payments and the QOF mortality benefit
assuming a cost-effectiveness threshold of £30,000/QALY.
The ICER was below thresholds of £30,000/QALY,
£20,000/QALY and £13,000/QALY with QOF incentive
payment levels of £893,979,617 (64% of the base-case
value), £628,579,418 (45%) and £446,989,808 (32%),
respectively. Similarly, the ICER was below thresholds
of £30,000/QALY, £20,000/QALY and £13,000/QALY
with QOF age-adjusted mortality reductions of 5.89 (160%
of the base-case value), 8.25 (225%) and 11.59 (315%)
respectively.
Probabilistic sensitivity analyses
Fig. 3 shows the cost-effectiveness acceptability curve
from the probabilistic sensitivity analysis. The QOF
was cost-effective in 18.3%, 2.9% and 0.1% of probabil-
istic sensitivity analysis iterations using thresholds of
£30,000/QALY, £20,000/QALY and £13,000/QALY,
respectively. The 95% credible interval (i.e. the range
where 95% of probabilistic sensitivity analysis results
fell) for the ICER was £19,700/QALY to QOF domi-
nated (which means continuing the QOF would result
in higher costs and fewer QALYs compared to stopping
the QOF).
Discussion
In this study we modelled the cost-effectiveness of
continuing the QOF in the UK to evaluate whether the
incremental health gains from continuing the pay-for-
performance programme would be worth the additional
costs to do so. We found that the ICER for continuing
the QOF was £49,362/QALY, with an 18% probability of
being cost-effective in probabilistic sensitivity analysis
Table 2 Base-case population-level results and incremental cost-effectiveness analysis of continuing the QOF vs. stopping the QOF
Undiscounted Discounted
life years QALYs QOF-related costs life years QALYs QOF-related costs ICER (£/QALY)
Stopping the QOF 78,805,931 59,562,301 £0 52,426,797 39,966,375 £0 Reference
Continuing the QOF 79,433,681 60,237,416 £25,881,916,480 52,750,331 40,316,707 £17,293,239,670 49,362
Delta 627,750 675,114 £25,881,916,480 323,534 350,332 £17,293,239,670 –
QOF Quality and Outcomes Framework, QALY quality-adjusted life year, ICER incremental cost-effectiveness ratio
Table 3 Cost-effectiveness ratios (£/QALY) for continuing the QOF versus stopping the QOF under various model scenarios
QOF effects beyond mortality How long QOF mortality benefit is sustained if QOF discontinued**
Non-fatal outcomes Increased drug costs No waning 1-year waning 3-year waning 5-year waning 10-year waning
Included Included 49,362* 51,970 57,616 63,765 81,428
Included Not included 48,768 51,347 56,931 63,011 80,478
Not included Included 80,515 84,323 92,565 101,535 127,281
Not included Not included 79,657 83,424 91,575 100,446 125,907
QOF Quality and Outcomes Framework, QALY quality-adjusted life year
*Base-case scenario: non-fatal outcomes and increased drug costs included and instant changes in the QOF mortality benefit if the QOF is discontinued
**In waning scenarios, we assumed linear declines in the QOF mortality benefit from the first year in the model to a time in the future (1, 3, 5 or 10 years from
the model start), at which point the mortality benefit from the QOF would equal zero
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using a cost-effectiveness threshold of £30,000/QALY.
This estimate was robust to variation in assumptions
related to non-fatal outcomes, increased drug costs and
waning of benefits from the QOF. A probabilistic sensi-
tivity analysis found that the QOF was cost-effective in
only 18% of the scenarios tested. We found that ICERs
of the QOF were substantially more favourable only in
those scenarios where the QOF was associated with
large reductions (beyond our base-case estimates) in (1)
costs associated with averted health events or (2)
non-fatal cardiovascular disease events. The estimated
population opportunity cost of continuing the QOF
(in terms of incremental net health benefit) was
226,109–979,917 QALYs lost.
Our estimate of the ICER for the QOF is above the
conventional threshold of £20,000–30,000/QALY that is
used to determine cost-effectiveness in the UK. This sug-
gests that primary-care pay-for-performance in the United
Kingdom has not been a cost-effective strategy to improve
health. Nonetheless, our base-case analysis treats QOF
incentive costs as incremental to the health system. We
assumed that stopping the QOF would return all incentive
payments to the NHS. However, if the NHS decided to
stop the QOF and return all or some of the QOF
payments to providers as increased capitation payments,
as has already happened in Scotland, this would maintain
the costs for the QOF while losing the benefits (unless the
benefits from the QOF remain or wane over time after the
Fig. 2 Two-way sensitivity analysis showing the optimal strategy for different combinations of the levels of QOF incentive payments and the QOF
mortality benefit. The green regions show combinations of values that resulted in an ICER < £30,000/QALY for continuing the QOF compared to
stopping the QOF, yellow indicates an ICER of £30,000/QALY and red indicates an ICER of >£30,000/QALY. ICER incremental cost-effectiveness
ratio, QALY quality-adjusted life year, QOF Quality and Outcomes Framework
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financial incentives are stopped). Relative to this scenario,
continuing the QOF would be more favourable. In sensi-
tivity analyses, we found that continuing the QOF would
be cost-effective (ICER < £30,000/QALY or < £13,000/
QALY) if QOF incentive payments (see Fig. 2) were
respectively 32% or 64% lower than our base-case estimate,
assuming that the mortality impact of QOF remained un-
changed. Our analysis gives policymakers cost-effectiveness
information for all joint scenarios of QOF payment and
mortality benefit estimates to facilitate decision-making
around lower QOF payments considering potential reduc-
tions in QOF benefits that would follow from these
decisions. Our results were not sensitive to the assumption
of concentrating the QOF benefits in those with cardiovas-
cular disease, as shown with an ICER > £30,000/QALY,
even if assuming the QOF equally benefited all individuals
aged 0–74 years with and without disease.
In general, cost-effectiveness analyses of pay-for-per-
formance policies, especially those that use QALYs as the
effectiveness measure (i.e. cost–utility analyses), are rare.
In a systematic review of economic evaluations of
pay-for-performance policies, Emmert and co-authors
found only one cost–utility analysis [10]. That study, by
Nahra and co-authors, modelled how hospital process
improvements in heart-related care could be used to
estimate QALYs via improved medication compliance
and found that the pay-for-performance policy was cost-
effective [13]. Since the publication of the review by
Emmert et al., Meacock et al. and Walker et al. performed
cost–utility analyses of pay-for-performance policies.
Meacock and colleagues evaluated the cost-effectiveness
of a pay-for-performance scheme for hospitals in the UK
(the Advancing Quality programme) using reductions in
30-day mortality (among patients admitted for pneumo-
nia, heart failure or acute myocardial infarction) estimated
from a difference-in-difference study and found that
the programme was cost-effective using a threshold of
£20,000/QALY [11]. Walker and co-authors used previ-
ously published literature to estimate the potential
cost-effectiveness of the QOF. They found that, for
most QOF indicators studied, a less than 1% improvement
would be needed for the programme to be cost-effective
(using the £20,000–30,000/QALY threshold range).
However, this study used estimates from randomised
controlled trials to extrapolate the hypothetical effects
of incentivising individual activities for which evidence
on effectiveness was available, rather than estimating
the impact of the overall programme [9].
Our study conflicts with previous attempts to estimate
the cost-effectiveness of pay-for-performance policies.
Only the Meacock et al. study used effectiveness estimates
(reduction in mortality that was translated to QALYs
gained) that were directly measured, as opposed to ex-
trapolating intermediate outcomes (such as improvements
in medication compliance) to QALYs. The Meacock cost-
effectiveness study was based on a difference-in-difference
Fig. 3 Cost-effectiveness acceptability curve for the probabilistic sensitivity analysis. The curve shows the probability that the QOF was cost-effective. It
was calculated as the proportion of iterations with ICERs that were less than a given cost-effectiveness threshold. The health benefit (base-case value
of 3.68 per 100,000 age-adjusted mortality reduction) was randomly drawn from a normal distribution (95% confidence interval −0.80 to 8.16). ICER
incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, QALY quality-adjusted life year, QOF Quality and Outcomes Framework
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analysis that found no significant impact of a hospital-
based pay-for-performance programme on outcomes
for two of the incentivised conditions (acute myocardial
infarction and heart failure) and a modest improvement
for the third (pneumonia) after 18 months [36]. However,
this improvement was not sustained and re-analysis of the
original data using a synthetic control approach found
that the initial improvement for pneumonia was not
statistically significant [37, 38]. Unlike the Meacock et al.
study, we were not able directly to measure and thus
include the administrative costs of running the pay-for-
performance programme. Our study is the first to evaluate
the cost-effectiveness of the QOF using direct estimates
of mortality (as opposed to intermediate outcomes or
hospital-based pay-for-performance policies).
Our study has several limitations, including four related
to data limitations. First, we could not estimate adminis-
trative costs due to data limitations. If administrative cost
data become available, these costs could be added to the
annual incentive costs in our sensitivity analysis around
costs (the horizontal axis in Fig. 2) to estimate the impact
of these costs on the cost-effectiveness results. The
addition of these administrative costs would increase the
ICER for continuing the QOF. Second, although our
model cohort was simulated until death, we restricted
QOF mortality effects up to age 74 years given the source
data [6]. Third, we also had limited information on the ef-
fect of the QOF on costs, such as those of additional visits
to practices, referrals to secondary care and medication
prescriptions. For instance, there are very few studies esti-
mating the impact of the QOF on health-care utilisation,
which is why we relied on a 2008 observational study from
Scotland to estimate incentivised drug costs despite our
model assuming a causal relationship between the QOF
incentives and increased utilisation. To address this, we
performed a sensitivity analysis around this input value,
which showed that cost savings because of the QOF (i.e.
averted utilisation costs outweighing the incentive costs)
would be necessary to make the QOF cost-effective using
a threshold of £30,000/QALY. Fourth, we also had incom-
plete information about the effects of the QOF on non-
fatal outcomes, such as acute myocardial infarction and
stroke. To address this, we varied our estimates across a
range of assumptions about the effects of the QOF
non-fatal outcomes and found that the ratio of fatal-to-
non-fatal events would need to be more than doubled
from our base-case estimate to make the QOF cost-effect-
ive. Fifth, our results from a probabilistic sensitivity ana-
lysis showed that there is considerable statistical
uncertainty around the cost-effectiveness of continuing
the QOF, suggesting that more precise estimates of the ef-
fect of the QOF on mortality could reduce the uncertainty
around the decision of whether to continue the QOF. We
also varied only one parameter (the effectiveness of the
QOF) in the probabilistic sensitivity analysis because it
was the only input with a well-estimated 95% confidence
interval. Adding other parameters to the probabilistic sen-
sitivity analysis could produce a higher uncertainty in our
cost-effectiveness results, but that would not change the
overall conclusion of our analysis. Sixth, QOF is subject
to annual review and amendment [6–8, 24, 26], and our
main estimates for the effectiveness and incentives
costs were based on the first 7 years of the programme.
Therefore, our analysis is evaluating the decision to
continue with incentives contained in QOF from 2004
to 2010 versus discontinuing these incentives. We have
not evaluated the most recent versions of the QOF, for
which we do not have linked cost and effectiveness
data, but incentives for the conditions of interest were
retained in these versions.
Despite these limitations, our findings imply that the
UK should redesign the QOF or pursue alternative
interventions to improve population health efficiently.
The QOF is already in transition. The programme was
reduced in scope in 2014, with 40 indicators retired to
focus on a set of 83 key indicators [7, 39]. In Scotland,
the QOF was withdrawn altogether in 2016, with practices
continuing to receive payments based on their historical
performance without any further need to meet QOF
targets. In the future, quality improvement in Scottish
practices will be managed by local peer support networks
and will rely on clinical governance arrangements rather
than financial incentives [40]. NHS England is also now
seeking to develop a successor to the QOF [41]. To enable
informed decisions on further redesign or replacement
of the QOF, future research should compare the cost-
effectiveness of the programme with alternative system-
level interventions (whether these programmes are
different forms of financial incentives for providers or
patients, or use other mechanisms to improve quality,
costs or access to care). Similar research should be under-
taken in other settings where pay-for-performance has
been implemented, comparing its cost-effectiveness with
other health system-level policies such as value-based
insurance design [42], computerised decision support
interventions [43] or value-based outcome reporting
tools [44]. These future analyses would provide crucial
information about whether pay-for-performance in pri-
mary care is a cost-effective way to improve population
health.
Conclusions
Compared to stopping the QOF and returning all associ-
ated incentive payments to the NHS, continuing the QOF
is not cost-effective. To improve population health
efficiently, the UK should redesign the QOF or pursue
alternative interventions.
Pandya et al. BMC Medicine  (2018) 16:135 Page 9 of 13
Appendix
Table 4 Estimates of incentive payments to UK practices under the Quality and Outcomes Framework (inflated to 2016£)
Year Englanda Northern Irelanda Scotlandb Walesa Total
2004/5 £830,220,692 £36,069,236 £90,923,805 £48,008,831 £1,005,222,565
2005/6 £1,350,199,371 £58,115,719 £155,248,597 £79,707,784 £1,643,271,471
2006/7 £1,237,234,310 £53,602,369 £144,140,152 £73,024,636 £1,508,001,467
2007/8 £1,213,821,483 £52,481,420 £142,189,299 £72,081,589 £1,480,573,791
2008/9 £1,147,372,625 £49,335,331 £135,246,153 £67,898,096 £1,399,852,206
2009/10 £1,128,185,395 £48,508,555 £132,825,069 £66,939,222 £1,376,458,241
2010/11 £1,122,907,420 £46,715,424 £128,483,891 £66,415,581 £1,364,522,315
Total £8,029,941,295 £344,828,055 £929,056,966 £474,075,739 £9,777,902,056
aBased on estimates from the Information Centre for Health and Social Care [24, 26]
bBased on payment data from the Information Services Division Scotland [27]
Table 5 Drug classes, changes in utilisation and annual prices
Drug classa DDD/PU/mob Annual pricec
Lipid regulating drugs 1.92 61.57
Renin angiotensin 0.84 37.29
Thiazides/diuretics 0.24 5.66
Oral antidiabetic 0.14 42.79
Antiplatelet 0.33 14.77
DDD defined daily dose, mo month, PU prescribing unit, QOF Quality and Outcomes Framework
aCardiovascular disease drug classes from MacBride-Stewart et al. [29]
bIncrease in defined daily doses (DDDs) per prescribing unit (PU) per month of QOF-related drugs
cWeighted average price (weights based on quantity dispensed by specific drugs and doses)
(source: Health and Social Care Information Centre. Prescription cost analysis, England 2012)
https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/publications/statistical/prescription-cost-analysis/prescription-cost-analysis-england-2012
Table 6 Population-level incremental net health benefit results
Net health benefit using different cost-effectiveness thresholds (QALYs)
Discounted QALYs Discounted costs £30,000/QALY threshold £20,000/QALY threshold £13,000/QALY threshold
Stopping the QOF 39,966,375 £0 39,966,375 39,966,375 39,966,375
Continuing the QOF 40,316,707 £17,293,239,670 39,740,266 39,452,046 38,986,458
Delta 350,332 £17,293,239,670 −226,109 −514,330 −979,917
QOF Quality and Outcomes Framework, QALY quality-adjusted life year
Table 7 One-way sensitivity analysis results
Variable Base-case value Sensitivity analysis range ICER at low value ICER at high value
Adjusted QOF mortality benefit (for those aged > 40 years
with CVD)
58.93 −130.57 to 12.81 QOF dominated £20,044/QALY
CVD prevalence, males (aged 45–64 years, aged 65–74 years) 14.6%, 28.5% ±20% £49,266/QALY £49,485/QALY
CVD prevalence, females (aged 45–64 years, aged 65–74 years) 8.4%, 22.5% ±20% £49,302/QALY £49,414/QALY
CVD mortality multiplier (male, female) 1.6, 2.1 ±20% £47,246/QALY £51,249/QALY
CVD utility 0.796 ±20% £43,516/QALY £64,805/QALY
Acute CVD event costs (i.e. costs within first year of CVD event) £10,871 ±20% £49,850/QALY £48,874/QALY
Chronic CVD event costs (i.e. annual costs for all years after
first year)
£3282 ±20% £50,350/QALY £48,375/QALY
Average NHS costs by age Age-based table £0 to +100% £46,270/QALY £52,455/QALY
Discount rate 3.5% 0–5% £38,337/QALY £54,587/QALY
Base-case ICER of £49,362/QALY; base-case values for each variable are reported in Table 1 in the main text
CVD cardiovascular disease, ICER incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, NHS National Health Service, QALY quality-adjusted life year, QOF Quality and
Outcomes Framework
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Fig. 4 Cost-effectiveness ratio (£/QALY) for the QOF versus non-QOF as a function of QOF-incentivised utilisation costs. ICER incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio, QALY quality-adjusted life year, QOF Quality and Outcomes Framework
Fig. 5 Cost-effectiveness ratio (£/QALY) for the QOF versus non-QOF
as a function of non-fatal-to-fatal CVD events averted. CVD cardiovas-
cular disease, ICER incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, QALY quality-
adjusted life year, QOF Quality and Outcomes Framework
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Additional file
Additional file 1: The model, which is the full simulation model used to
perform the cost-effectiveness analyses, is programed in Microsoft Excel
with Visual Basic for Applications (VBA). (XLSM 648 kb)
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